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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

In this appeal, payers of certain water, sewer and sanitation fees, challenge a decision

made by the district court to dismiss the payers' complaint for damages and equitable relief
pertaining to such fees which were impermissibly charged and used by the City of Pocatello.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On April 15, 2014, plaintiffs/appellants filed a "Complaint Jury Demand and Request for
Class Certification" (Complaint) against the respondent/defendant City of Pocatello (City) for
damages and equitable relief pertaining to the City's improper use of certain water, sewer and
sanitation fees. 1 The Complaint bases liability in large part upon a prior case and decision
decided by the district court in "The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho
(BCASEI) v. City of Pocatello" Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (Building Contractors Case). 2
On February 17, 2015, appellants/plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Class Certification" with
supporting affidavits. 3 On March 16, 2015, the respondent/defendant filed a Motion for

1

R. Vol. I, pp. 11-18. (Complaint.) Due to the manner in which the Clerk's Record was
provided in this appeal, it will be cited to herein as follows: The initial clerk's record filed on
June 8, 2016, will be referenced as "R. Vol. I." The supplemental record entitled "Additional
Documents that Appellants Requested from Case #CV-2011-5228-0C" will be referenced as "R.
App. Supp." The supplemental record entitled "Additional Documents that Respondent
Requested from Case #CV-2011-5228-0C" will be referenced as "R. Resp. Supp." Of further
note, the electronic record provided to appellants/plaintiffs does not contain bates stamp or page
numbers. As such, the page numbers referenced in the brief correspond with the page numbers
shown on "Adobe Reader." The cited pleadings are also specifically referenced.
2

R. Vol. I, pp. 12-13.

3

R. Vol. I, p. 4. (ROA Report.)

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 4

Summary Judgment, supported by the "Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein."4
Appellants/plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion
supported by the affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen on April 1, 2015, along with other objections. 5
Respondent/defendant filed a reply in support of its summary judgment along with a "Third
Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein" on April 7, 2015, as well as a response in opposition to
appellants/plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 6 After an initial hearing was held on the
pending motions on April 13, 2015, the district court requested additional briefing. 7
Appellants/respondents subsequently filed a "Supplemental Memorandum" in opposition to the
summary judgement motion and in support of their motion for class certification with supporting
affidavits from Ed Quin and Logan Robinson. 8 On June 5, 2015, Respondent/defendant filed a
"Sur Reply Memorandum" in support of its motion for summary judgment along with a "Fourth
Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein."9 Appellants/respondents objected to and moved to strike Ms
Stroschein's affidavit on June 12, 2015. 10

4

R. Vol. I, p. 5.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

R. Vol. I, pp. 5-6, 286, 701.

8

R. Vol. I, p. 6.

9

Id.

10

Id. See pp. 595-597 for text and basis of the motion.
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On June 16, 2015, appellants/plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a first amended
complaint. 11 A renewed motion to amend and memorandum in support of the motion was filed
on July 10, 2015, with hearing set for August 10, 2015. 12 Respondent/defendant filed a response
in opposition to the motion to amend and moved to reset the hearing to August 17, 2015, at
which time the district court heard additional argument with regard to the pending motions. 13
The district court issued a "Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Discussing Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and Denying
Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint" along with a
"Judgment" dismissing appellants/plaintiffs' claims on November 10, 2015. 14 On November 24,
2015, appellants/plaintiffs moved to reconsider the decision to dismiss their complaint with
subsequent supporting affidavits and briefs, which was denied by the district court on February
10, 2016, in its "Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration." 15 The
district court also issued a decision denying respondent/defendant's request for discretionary
costs and attorney fees. 16 On March 22, 2016, appellants/plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal. 17

11

R. Vol I, p. 6.

12

Id. p. 7.

13

Id., Tr. pp. 6-42.

14

R. Vol. I, pp. 700-734

15

R. Vol. I, pp. 735-36, 785-793.

16

R. Vol. I, pp. 794-799.

17

R. Vol. I, pp. 802-804.
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STATEMENT OFF ACTS

The City has implemented "system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as
"connection fees" or "capacity fees" (Connection/Capacity Fees) which a person must pay along
with a separate "building permit fee" prior to or in relation to new construction. 18
Connection/Capacity Fees consist of separate fees charged for water, waste water, and waste
collection as set by the City Council on an annual basis. 19 Usually at the same time the City sets
Connection/Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User Fees" for customers of the City
water, wastewater and sanitation collection system. 20 The City deposits the collected
Connection/Capacity and User Fees into separate accounts for water, waste water, and
sanitation. 21
Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity/Connection Fees and
User Fees titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,""Rate of Return," "Franchise
Fee," and "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT." 22 This
program was "formalized" by then City CFO Dave Swindell and approved by the City Council. 23

18

t9
20

21

R. Vol. I, pp. 268, 271-73. (Aff. of Ed Quinn and attachment.)
Id.
R. Vol. I, pp. 230, 233-255 (Aff. of Logan Robinson and attachment.)
R. Vol. I, p. 396 (Dep. Of City CFO Swindell, Ex. 10)

22

R. Vol. I, pp. 380, 81, 399-404, (Swindell Dep. pp. 79-83, Ex. 18) pp. 342-346 (Mem.
Dec. in CV-2011-5228, containing citations to and summary of the facts pertaining to the PILOT
program)
23

Id.
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The purpose of the PILOT as described by the City Mayor in 2005 was to allow for a "rate of
return" or profit on each utility "equal to 7% of the equity in each business."24 As indicated by
the City Mayor at the time, this "money goes to the General Fund which the City Council utilizes

as a property tax substitution. " 25 Since at least FY 2006, the City has transferred at least
$28,329,231 of the water and sewer funds into the City's general revenue fund under the PILOT,
with $8,773,548 transferred from 2011 through 2014 alone. 26 Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson
- who is not a resident of the City of Pocatello - indicates that the City had collected $840,000
from him in User Fees since the implementation of the PILOT program. 27 Presumably 10% of
those fees consisted of the PILOT component, or no less than $84,000. 28
The City relied upon "studies"conducted by Red Oak Consulting, Inc. (Red Oak) in 2006
and 2010 as the supporting basis for the assessment of User Fees and Connection/Capacity Fees
(prepared for water and wastewater respe_ctively). 29
The City Resolutions establishing the Connection/Capacity Fees and User Fees for each
of the years that the PILOT programs were in existence contains the following virtually similar
language:

24

R. Vol. I, p. 404 (Aug. 22, 2005, letter from then City Mayor Chase.)

25

Id. (emphasis added)

26

R. Vol. I, p. 274, 365. (City of Poe. "Review of Transfers for PILOT.")

27

R. Vol. I, p. 529 (May. 22, 2015, Aff. Logan Robinson)

2s

Id.

29

R. Vol. I, pp. 271-73 (sample City Resolution est. fees.), p. 122 (Mem. Dec. on SJ in
Building Contractors Case), pp. 47-67, 541-553 (sections from the respective reports.)
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WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 authorizes sanitary sewer rates
and plant capacity fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; and,
WHEREAS, the City Council retained the engineering firm of Red Oak Consulting to
prepare a rate study to project revenues and costs for 2011-2015 and to recommend
necessary sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and
WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that fees and charges for the sanitary sewer
system as previously set by Resolution (applicable resolution) should be revised for Fiscal
Year (applicable year) in accordance with that study;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES AND FEES FOR FISCAL (YEAR)
SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS: 30
In early 2007, the City made a request to the Idaho State Attorney General for an opinion
as to the legality of the PILOT. 31 Then Mayor Roger Chase both wrote to and met with the
Attorney General seeking his opinion on the legality of the PILOT. 32 Mayor Chase indicates that
he wanted to "move the city away from (unpopular) property taxes and to a fee based system"
and wanted "an opinion to make sure your office is still comfortable with the City charging (the
PILOT"). 33
On February 6, 2007, the Attorney General's office responded with a detailed legal
opinion indicating that the City's PILOT fee "does not conform to the requirements of existing
case law."34 On April 9, 2007, the City attorney requested that the Attorney General
"reconsider" its opinion in light of the Supreme Court decision City of Chubbuck v. City of

30

31

R. Vol. I, pp. 230, 233-255.
R. App. Supp., p. 27

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

R. App. Supp., pp. 33-37.
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Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1999), among other decisions. 35 On April
19, 2007, the Attorney General's office responded, indicating that "we have carefully reviewed
the issue, the relevant authorities, and the arguments that have been raised; however, based on
this review and consideration, we are not inclined to change our previous conclusions."36 The
letter then further advises the City as follows:
Regardless of whether the largest percentage of the fee is imposed for other than revenue
raising purposes, the fact remains that one part of the fee has been calculated with the
specific intent of providing funding for municipal services that are separate and apart
from the underlying regulatory purpose. No matter what these funds are called, to the
extent they are not reasonably related to the regulated activity, it is our opinion that they
are an impermissible revenue raising assessment. 37
After the City received this solicited advice from the State Attorney General's office, the
City nevertheless proceeded with its PILOT fee which collected $28,329,231 through November
of2013 (when it was shut down by Court order, see infra.)38 The City also took measures to hide
the fact that it had received this advice, i.e. by failing to disclose the opinions and
correspondence with the Attorney General's office in discovery in the Building Contractors Case.
39

Additionally, there is evidence that the City deliberately withheld and destroyed public records

that should have been preserved under the public records laws. 40

35

36

R. App. Supp., pp. 38-39.
R. App. Supp., pp. 41-42.

37

Id. p. 40.

38

R. Vol. I, p. 274, 365.

39

R. App. Supp., pp. 20-22 (Aff. Nathan Olsen.)

40

R. App. Supp., pp. 76-90, 105-109, 111-112 (pleadings pertaining to "Plaintiffs
Renewed Motion for Sanctions under IRCP 37(b)" filed in the Building Contractors Case.)
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In January of 2012, the Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI)
filed an action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for
Bannock County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Building Contractors Case) challenging the
legality of the City's Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. 41 The City's CFO Dave Swindell in his initial affidavit in support of the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the Building Contractors Case refers to the PILOT as a "fee" throughout,
classifying it as a "franchise fee," "impact fee," or "internal franchise fee." 42
During the course of the litigation in the Building Contractors Case, in March of 2013,
the City created two separate funds to hold the water and sewer connection fees (Funds 37/38),
and then transferred into those funds from the general fund the equivalent of what it had
collected and used from the connection fees from 2007 through 2013. 43 The total amount
deposited into the two newly created accounts at that time was $2,557,900.56. 44
In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the district court
held that the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent were
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Specifically, the Court held
that:
[B]ased on the fact that the City has historically commingled the user and connection fees
into a single account, the Court will also address the permissibility of drawing a PILOT

41

R. Vol. I, p. 701 (Mem. Dec. p. 2.) The parties in this case stipulated that the district
court could take judicial notice of the facts in the Building Contractors Case. (See ft 2.)
42

R. Vol I, pp. 93-97 (Oct. 9, 2012, Aff. Dave Swindell par.'s 1-13.)

43

R. Vol I, p. 536, (Aug. 13, 2013, Tr. in the Building Contractors Case, pp. 34-35)

44

R. Vol I, p. 538 (as marked in the "June 30, 2013 "Statement of Cash" statement
provided by the City in the Building Contractors Case.)
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from both fees .... Since the PILOT fees are or have been transferred from revenue
collected from "rates, fees, and charges" of the water and sewer system, i.e. connection
and user fees, and are not used for a regulatory purpose nor for purposes allowed by the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the PILOT fee transfers
are impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees or both - all of
which is contrary to Idaho statutory and case law... [I]t is the Court's determination that
any fee which includes a PILOT component is unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to
statute. 45
Pursuant to the district court's order, the City reduced its user fee rates by I 0% , but made
no adjustments to the Connection/Capacity Fee rates. 46 BCASEI subsequently moved for an
order to "show cause" why the Connection/Capacity Fee rates were not also adjusted. 47
BCASEI' s application was denied because the district court upheld the City's calculation of the
fee based upon the Red Oak studies, and that there was "no evidence" that the
Connection/Capacity Fee calculation was "charged" upon the impermissible PILOT fee. 48 The
Building Contractors Case was not appealed.
After the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their complaint in this case, in the summer of 2014,
the plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment to freeze the newly created Funds
37/38 as a potential source ofrecovery for damages. 49 The City submitted the Affidavit of Joyce
A. Stroschein in response to Plaintiffs' motion. 50 Ms. Stroschein's sworn testimony includes the

45

R. Vol I, p. 357.

46

R. Resp. Supp., p. 872 (Certificate of Compliance) pp. 898-900 (News Article attached
to Aff. of Nathan Olsen in support of show cause.)
47

R. Resp. Supp., pp. 872-903.

48

R. Vol. I., pp. 193-94 (Dec. on Plaintiffs Application for Order to Show Cause.)

49

50

R. Vol. I, pp. 32-33.
R. Vol. I, pp. 33-44.
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following explanation with regard to Funds 37/38:
Funds 37 and 38 are the funds which record the connection/capacity fees. These funds
are comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that have been collected by the City's
water and wastewater departments. At no point has the City ever deposited any user fees
that contain a PILOT component into Funds 37 or 38, these funds represent the entirety of
the connection/capacity funds collected by the City since its inception in 2007. The third
fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 are the debt service funds for the water
and wastewater departments. The debt service funds are reserves that are set aside to
meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond covenants.

In the past monies are (sic) transferred into these funds from Funds 31 and 32,
but after the creation of Funds 37 and 38 we have budgeted and transferred monies
to Funds 60 and 61 to cover the required current debt service payment. 51
Ms. Stroschein goes onto testify that:
Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has determined that the
connection/capacity fees will be used for debt services. As such, the City budgeted
approximately $725,826 for debt services for the water department in FY2014. The City
intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt service in FY 2015. The City
has budgeted approximately $1,384,780 for debt service for the wastewater department in
FY 2014. This will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. 52
Thus the equivalent of all of the City's connection fee funds collected from 2007 through
2015 have been allocated or spent on the City's debt service payment. Of further note, in adding
up the numbers an additional $320,949 in connection fees had been deposited since the end of
June 2013 - through July 15-2014. Thus the total amount of fees deposited into those accounts
since its inception in March of 2013 through July 15 of2014 is $2,878,849.56 - all of which has
been allocated toward "debt retirement."
The City's use and calculation of the Connection/Capacity Fees for "debt services" is not
consistent with what was reported and relied upon in the Red Oak studies. The studies explicitly
indicate that the "debt service" payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained from the

51

R. Vol. I. p. 38. par. 14. (Emphasis Added.)

52

Id. par. 15.
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monthly user fees. 53 Such debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" factored into the
monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. 54 The studies are also explicit in that the capacity
or connection fees are based solely on the "replacement" of the existing system through capital
improvement projects. 55
The studies then make a virtually identical and critically important disclosure with regard
to the assessment and calculation of the Connection/Capacity Fees:
To determine net equity in the system, replacement costs of the net equity in the system,
replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the outstanding debt on
related facilities. Equity is not reduced by accumulated depreciation. Once a new
customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system, that customer begins paying charges
for service similar to all existing customers. These charges typically include payment for
retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding
debt from system value before developing these (connection/capacity) fees. 56
Thus, because the Connection/Capacity Fees were in fact allocated toward debt retirement
rather than "replacement" of the "existing backbone" of the system, the Red Oak studies could
not have contained an accurate calculation of the Connection/Capacity Fees. Again, such facts,
i.e. the allocation of Connection/Capacity Fees toward debt retirement rather than the intended
uses stated uses in the Red Oak studies, were not known or determined until well after the district
court had denied BCASEI's "show cause" application in the Building Contractors Case.

53

R. Vol. I, pp. 541-53. (2010 Red Oak Studies on Water- Sections 3-1, 3.3.1, 3.4, and
3.4.2, and 2006 Wastewater - 2.2, 2.4, 2.4.3, and 2.5.)
54

Id. (Water Report Sections 3-3 and 5.3, Wastewater Report Section 5.2.)

55

Id. (Water Report Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6.2.1. Wastewater Report, Sections 3.1 - 3.3.

6.1, 6.2.)
56

Id. (Water Report Section 6.2.1., Wastewater Report 6.1.1. emphasis added.)
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court err in reclassifying an illegally imposed fee as
a "tax" and therefore preventing a takings claim?
2. Did the district court err in finding that there were no disputed facts over
whether the City acted without malice and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct?
3. Did the district court misapply retroactivity principles?
4. Did the district court errantly dismiss plaintiffs/appellants claims for damages
and equitable relief pertaining to the Connection/Capacity Fees?
ARGUMENT

I.

Standard of Review

A. The Standard of Review on Summary Judgment is De Novo.
As articulated by this Court in AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Horton explained:
This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the
"standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment." Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin.,
LLC, 152 Idaho 927,929,277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012) (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai
Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394,224 P.3d 458,461 (2008)). Summary
judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
I.R.C.P. 56(c). When applying this standard, this Court construes disputed facts
"in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee, 148 Idaho at
394,224 P.3d at 461. Where "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material
fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free
review." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793,
134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006) (citing In/anger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44
P.3d 1100 (2002)). However, to survive summary judgment, "an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
Therefore, "the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory
assertions that an issue of material fact exists .... " Jenkins v. Boise Cascade
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 15

Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005) (citing Northwest
Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002)).
"A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Id.
AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, 155 Idaho 159,163,307 P.3d 176,180 (2013)
B. The Standard of Review on Amending a Complaint is Abuse of Discretion.
In Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 27 (1997) the Idaho Supreme Court

explained the long-standing rules of the Court regarding decisions to grant or to refuse
permission to amend a complaint. It stated:
the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a complaint is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court when a party proposes to amend its complaint
after a responsive pleading is served. I.R.C.P. 15(a); Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho
606,570 P.2d 284 (1977). We also recognize that this Court has determined that a
trial court properly refuses permission to amend a complaint when the record
contains no allegations that, if proven, would entitle the party to the relief
claimed. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, 119
Idaho 171, 804 P .2d 900 (1991 ). Nonetheless, as this Court indicated in
Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986), in the
interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a
complaint.
When reviewing an exercise of discretion, a court on appeal conducts a three-tiered
inquiry. The lower court must have (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards
applicable to specific choices available to it, and (3) reached its conclusion by an exercise of
reason. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599,213 P.3d 384 (2009). Regarding the second tier of
the inquiry, some of the legal standards applicable are set forth in Hines v. Hines, supra. The
most basic of these legal standards is that district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to
amend a complaint. Hines, supra. This requirement is set forth explicitly in IRCP § 15(a) as
follows: "[L]eave shall be freely given whenjustice so requires."
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II.

The User Fees Collected Under the City Resolution Which Were
lmpermissibly Used for the PILOT Constitutes a "Taking" Because the City
had No Authority to Impose the PILOT in the First Place.

In its decision granting the City summary judgment, the district court held as a matter of
law and undisputed fact that the PILOT was a "tax," therefore making a recovery under a
recovery under the takings provisions of the federal constitution and 42 USC§ 1983
inapplicable. 57 However, in so doing, the court errantly applied the facts to the clearly
established authority here in Idaho which prevents public entities from essentially re-classifying
fees as "taxes" in order to deprive plaintiffs a takings claim, or from ever being able to obtain
relief for the unauthorized collection and use of fees for general revenue purposes.
The attempt to re-classify its fee as a "tax" to avoid liability has been tried by other public
entities in a takings claim, and has been soundly rejected by this Court. In BHA Investments, Inc.
v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004), the district court had accepted the City of
Boise's argument that its "liquor license transfer fee" was in fact a "disguised tax" and therefore
the plaintiffs were required to "pay the tax under protest" pursuant to Idaho law in order to
preserve a claim ofrecovery. Id. 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 323. The Court resoundingly
defeated such notion, with the following analysis and holding which is highly relevant to this
case:
We have held that when a governmental entity imposes what is on its face a tax,
the taxpayer must pay it under protest in order to preserve the right to claim a
refund. Walker v. Wedgwood, 64 Idaho 285, 130 P.2d 856 (1942) (income tax);
Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho 108, 6 P. 124 (1885) (property tax). We have also held
that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a reasonable
relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the imposition of a
tax. Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). We have
not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to
impose at all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered.
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The purpose of the analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from
imposing an illegal tax by masquerading it as a fee. That analysis does not apply,
however, where the city does not have the authority to impose either the tax or the
fee. If it has no authority to impose any fee at all, it does not matter whether
the fee imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the services provided. It is
illegal regardless of the amount of the fee. In this case, the City did not have
the authority to impose either a fee for the transfer of a liquor license or a tax
on the transfer of a liquor license. Therefore, the analysis of whether liquor
license transfer fee was in reality a disguised tax does not apply.
We have declined to apply the payment-under-protest requirement to an action
seeking recovery of unlawful fees. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994),
we held that interstate motor carriers were entitled to recover the portion of their
state registration fees that exceeded the amount authorized by federal law even
though they had not paid those fees under protest. There was no statute requiring
that the fees be paid under protest in order to challenge them, and we refused to
apply the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement to the motor carriers in that
case.

The City ordinance denominated the sum owing as a "transfer fee," not a
tax. In BHA I, the City argued that it was a properly imposed fee and not a
tax. Now, the City contends it was a tax all along and that Bravo and
Splitting Kings should be denied recovery because they did not pay that
"tax" under protest. Where the City denominated the sum owing as a "fee,"
the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement does not apply. The district
court erred in holding that Bravo and Splitting Kings were required to have paid
the liquor license transfer fee under protest in order to bring this action.
Id. (emphasis added)

In summary, the BHA Court clearly indicated that a City can't impose what it first
classifies as a "fee," and then avoid liability by later identifying it as a "tax." As the Supreme
Court aptly notes, it is not really a question as to whether the monies were used as a "fee" or a
"disguised tax," but rather whether the city had the authority to impose the fee in the first place.
Id. In BHA, the City of Boise had no legal authority to impose a "liquor license transfer fee" and

therefore it mattered not how the City classified the fee, i.e. as a "fee" or "tax." Id. In addition,
the BHA Court held that the unauthorized fee constituted a "taking" of private property,
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compensable under the "United States and Idaho Constitutions" and not subject to the Idaho Tort
Claims Act. Id. 141 Idaho at 172, 108 P .3d at 319.
This Court has also recently clarified this issue to further suggest that a "disguised tax" is
still considered a "fee" for the purposes of a takings claim. In re Certified Question ofLaw

White, 156 Idaho 77,320 P.3d 1236 (2014). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court received a
certified question from the U.S. District Court for the District ofldaho with regard to when the
statute of limitations applied upon the payment of a tax. Id. However, in so doing, the Court
discussed the differences between what is considered a "tax" and a "fee" for the purposes of a
taking under the Idaho and Federal Constitution, stating:
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge some confusion
resulting from the parties' interchangeable use in their briefing of the terms " fee"
and "tax." A tax is generally a tax. A fee can be either a legitimate fee or a
disguised tax.

Id, 156 Idaho at 82, 320 P.3d at 1241 1236 (2014) (emphasis added)
Thus, the Supreme Court has further clarified that a fee used as a "disguised tax" is still a
fee for purposes of a takings.
The same principle established in BHA applies in this case. The City resolutions
establishing both the User Fees and Connection/Capacity Fees for each of the years from which it
derived the impermissible PILOT contain the virtually language which explicitly refers to the
revenue as "fees."58 Additionally, the "Red Oak" studies that the City relied upon in establishing
the fee rates never classify any portion of the utility fees as "taxes," but rather as "fees" collected
for the purposes allowed under IC§ 50-1033, et al. 59 Additionally, the City's CFO Dave
Swindell in his initial affidavit in support of the City's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
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Building Contractors Case refers to the PILOT as a "fee" throughout, classifying it as a
"franchise fee," "impact fee," or "internal franchise fee." 60
Thus, the facts unquestionably show that the City implemented and represented the
PILOT as part of the utility "fee" under the guise ofIC § 50-1028, et al. The City only decided to
re-term the PILOT as a "tax" well after the fact. However, the he City never had authority under

law to implement the PILOT regardless of its classification or improper use as a general revenue
source or a "disguised tax." Thus, in this case, even if the PILOT were classified as a "disguised
tax," it is still an improperly collected "fee" for the purposes of a takings action.
Further, as addressed in the BHA decision, to not allow plaintiffs/appellants to recover the
improperly collected fees because they are re-classified as "taxes" would be unjust and would in
fact condone improper conduct of the City. In BHA, the City of Boise was clearly attempting to
avoid liability after-the-fact by re-defining their improper fee as a "tax" which was "not paid
under protest" by the plaintiffs, and therefore not recoverable. The City in this case took a
similar tack, attempting to avoid liability under the takings provisions of the Idaho and U.S.
Constitution by first collecting the monies as a "fee" and then converting them for use as a "tax"
for general revenue purposes. The effect of allowing this impropriety would be to forever bar the
damaged fee payers from recovering improperly imposed fees illegally and unconstitutionally
used for "general revenue" purposes. That is the very injustice that the this Court emphatically
addressed in BHA Investments, and should have been applied by the district court. Its errant
decision should therefore be reversed.
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III.

There are Disputed Facts as to Whether the Imposition of the PILOT Fee
was Reckless, Wilful or Wanton Conduct making it Actionable under IC § 6-904A.

In dismissing the plaintiffs' "state claims," in particular their "unjust enrichment," and
"equitable estoppel" claims, the district court's Memorandum Decision relies upon IC § 6-904A
which exempts entities from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act for claims that "arise out
of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee." 61 However, in so doing, the court provided no
analysis as to whether there was factual support that the City acted "without malice" and
"without reckless, willful and wanton conduct" which is defined under IC§ 6-904D(2), and
which would make the City liable under IC§ 6-904A even under the appellants/plaintiffs' state
claims.
"Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is defined in the act as "intentionally and
knowingly (doing) or (failing) to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and
which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." IC§ 6-904A. The term
"malice" in a civil context, as been defined very similarly by this Court:
At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a
wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse,
whether or not the injury was intended.

Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187, 731 P .2d 171, 182 (1986).
The record in this case (which includes the Building Contractors Case) contains a
substantial amount of evidence that - construing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs as the
non-moving party - at the very least raises a materially disputed fact as to whether the City has
acted with such intent, and therefore allowing this question to go before the jury.
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Chiefly, in 2007, the City made a request to the Idaho State Attorney General for an
opinion as to the legality of the PILOT, which it then completely defied and disregarded. 62
Notwithstanding clear advice and warning from the State Attorney General's office- provided at

the City's own request, the City nevertheless proceeded with its illegal and ill-advised PILOT fee
which improperly collected nearly $30 million until it was shut down by court order in
November of 2013. The City also took measures to hide the fact that it had received this advice.
Further, it continued to advance the City of Chubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho
198, 899 P .2d 411 ( 1999) as a legal basis for the PILOT, despite the Attorney General's advice of
its inapplicability. A jury could find that the conduct of this City was "creating unreasonable risk
of harm" to the plaintiffs, including a "high degree of probability that such harm will result." IC

§ 6-904C(2). In other words, the jury may find that the City knowingly proceeded with
implementing this blatantly illegal PILOT program, at a massive and unsupported cost to ratepayers, and that this conduct is wilful, reckless, etc.
Additionally, the district court also disregarded appellants/plaintiffs' "spoliation" and
"destruction of records" claims contained within their Complaint, which is further evidence of
the City's reckless and wilful conduct. 63 Again, these claims are supported by the record in the
Building Contractors Case, including the pleadings and affidavits provided in support of the
"Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Sanctions under IRCP 37(b)" filed on May 26, 2013. 64 There
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were a large number of records on this issue that should have been maintained by the City under
the public records retention statute, but were otherwise discarded or destroyed - even after the
City became aware of the plaintiffs' claims. These are additional facts that should go to the
jury's consideration as to whether the City acted with malice and recklessness.
In summary, in that the district court did not consider the City's conduct in implementing

the impermissible PILOT fee, plaintiffs/appellants' appeal should be granted even under their
claims falling under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. There is evidence to suggest that the City acted
with "malice" and with "recklessness," etc ... , that removes the exemption ofliability under IC §
6-904A.

IV.

The Retroactivity Principles Relied upon by the District Court to Dismiss
Plaintiffs/Appellants have no Application.

The district court's Memorandum Decision determined that the City is not liable to
plaintiffs/appellants' claims in this case because its decision in the Building Contractors Case
should not be "retroactively" applied. 65 This was a complete misapplication of the retroactivity
principals and was in many respects a nonsensical approach by the court.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho
168, 108 P .3d 315 (2004) also contains the applicable authority for when a decision should not
be applied retroactively, with a lengthy discussion of the principles behind such application and
its limitations. BHA 's procedural history indicates a prior Supreme Court decision wherein the
Court had detennined that the "transfer fee" in dispute was not authorized by law. See, BHA
Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 63 P.3d 482 (2003). After remand, the district
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court made a number of other decisions on the case which were then appealed and addressed in
the second BHA case. In addition, a companion case Bravo Entertainment, L.L. C. v. City of
Boise was filed on the very same issues, which was dismissed by the district court which held

that the Supreme Court's decision in first BHA case should not be "retroactively applied." BHA
II 141 Idaho at 171, 108 P.3d at 318. One issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's

decision in the first BHA decision finding the fee to be unauthorized should be "retroactively"
applied. It is critical to consider the complete holding of the BHA Court on this issue:
The decisions of this Court apply prospectively, to all future cases. The issue is whether
and to what extent they apply retroactively to past or pending cases. The usual rule is that
decisions of this Court apply retroactively to all past and pending cases. State v. Tipton,
99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 305 (1978). For policy reasons, however, this Court has
discretion to limit the retroactive application of a particular decision. We may hold that it
does not apply even to the case in which the decision was announced; or that it applies
only to that case and not to other past or pending cases; or that it applies to both that case
and pending cases, but not to past cases. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284
(1977). When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application of a decision, we
weigh three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law;
and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied
retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974). We balance the
first factor against the other two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application
of the decision. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977).
Id. 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320, (2004)(emphasis added).
In accordance with the precise ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court and its supporting

"policy reasons," whether there is a restriction on the "retroactive" application of a decision
clearly applies only to appellate decisions, or decisions of the Supreme Court, and are further
limited to decisions that in effect "overrules" or "rejects" a prior law.
A detailed discussion of this policy (as referred to in BHA) is also provided by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 608-609, 570 P.2d 284, 287-88 (1977). In
Jones, during the proceedings in the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a decision
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Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 723, 536 P.2d 291 (1975) which specifically "overruled"
prior Supreme Court authority on the issue in question (relating to the interpretation of the long
arm statute on the statute oflimitations). Jones, 98 Idaho at 608-610, 570 P.2d at 286-88. The
district court decided not to retroactively apply the Lipe decision. Id.
Referencing principles set forth in 10 ALR3d 13 77-78, the Jones Court suggested that the
decision on whether or not to "retroactively" apply a decision is only applicable to a "judicially
changed rule" or an "overruling decision." Much of the Jones decision addresses the policy and
limitations of the retroactive application doctrine:
The alternative of prospective application of decisions has a sound basis in policy
and legal theory. As the Washington Supreme Court noted: "So it is that the
doctrine of prospective overruling has attached in many areas: in constitutional
law, contracts, torts, criminal law, taxation, and in the field of procedure, giving
the doctrine both sanction and acceptance throughout our jurisprudence.
Prospective overruling imparts thatfinal degree of resilience, to the otherwise
rigid concepts of stare decisis, so necessary to prevent the system from
becoming brittle. It enables the law under stare decisis to grow and change to
meet the ever-changing needs of an ever-changing society and yet, at once, to
preserve the very society which gives it shape. The determination of whether an
overruling decision shall be applied retroactively or prospectively, is a matter left
to state courts for determination on a case-by-case basis. As the Alaska Supreme
CoUit noted: "A state supreme court has unfettered discretion to apply a
particular ruling either purely prospectively, purely retroactively, or partially
retroactively, limited only 'by the juristic philosophy of the judges their
conceptions oflaw, its origin and nature."
The determination of whether a rule is to be given retroactive application is
generally made pursuant to a balancing process, wherein the gain to be
acliieved in the administration ofjustice by accomplishment of the purpose of
the new rule (the first criterion) is balanced against the adverse effects on the
administration ofjustice resulting from the extent to which the courts have
mistakenly hut in goodfaitJ, relied on t!,e prevailing rule (tl,e second criterion)
and from an application of the new rule for t!,e purpose of reconsidering
determinations already finally made pursuant to t!,e then prevailing rule (the
tJ,ird criterion).
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
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In essence, the Jones decision affirms the need for the "overruling decision" of a
"prevailing rule" or stare decises before there is even a consideration of whether the "new rule"
should be retroactively applied. Id. It also further suggests that this power is limited to the "state
supreme court" which - is the judicial body that sets the rule. Id.
Given a full and proper consideration of the clearly established rules and policy affirmed
by this Court, the district court's ruling that prevented plaintiffs from seeking relief for liabilities
established under the Building Contractors Case is not supported by applicable law for a myriad
of reasons set forth below. First, the district court's Memorandum Decision in the Building
Contractors Case was not in any way an "overruling decision" of a "prevailing rule." In fact, the
reverse is true. It in truth relied upon prior Idaho Supreme Court authority in its decision. The
plaintiffs/appellants in this case are relying on this very same prior Supreme Court authority, or
the "prevailing rules" in support of their claims in this case - as well as additional Supreme
Court authority (i. e BHA Investments) decided well before the City implemented its
impermissible PILOT program.
Additionally, the district court simply does not hold the same status as the Supreme Court
or an appellate court, whose decisions have widespread ramifications, i.e. in the establishing of
"rules" that all of society must abide. It therefore did not have jurisdiction in the first place to
decide whether it could limit the "retroactive" effect of its decision.
Further, the district court's decision in the Building Contractors Case did not establish
any "rule" that "changed" or "overruled" any prior existing law or rule - and in fact the reverse is

true. The district court's Memorandum Decision issued on November 15, 2013, is replete with
numerous references to Idaho Supreme Court decisions that were decided well before the City
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implemented its PILOT program. In other words, the 201 ~ decision did not "change" or
"overrule" prior or existing rule, but rather affirmed prior rules established by the Idaho Supreme
Court which made the PILOT fee impermissible under law. The City shouldn't be allowed to
errantly rely upon the City ofChubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,202, 899 P.2d 411,
415 (1995) decision either to exempt itself from its improper conduct. The retroactivity doctrine
certainly should not apply to even a good faith misinterpretation of existing authority, which
would negate almost any potential liability and again is not a proper application of the
reotroactivity principle. In essence, there is no "retroactive" application of the law here, but
rather the City's conduct being challenged in this case is "prospective" to the rules and precedent
previously established by the Idaho Supreme Court. All the district court did in its November
2013 decision was uphold those rules.
Moreover, in this case the plaintiffs/appellants are not relying entirely upon the decision
of the district court decision in the Building Contractors Case for its authority in supporting their
claims in this case. Plaintiffs/appellants' briefing in this case is replete with Idaho Supreme
Court authority, in particular the BHA Investments decision decided in 2004, decided well before
the City's implementation of the PILOT fee. There is simply no authority or justification that
allowed the district court to in effect nullify the application of prior rules established by the
Idaho Supreme Court - which in actuality is a perverse use of its power.
In actuality, the district court in this case has errantly deprived Plaintiffs from relying
upon the existing authority or "prevailing rules" set by the Supreme Court. That approach simply
is inapposite of the policy adopted by Idaho with regard to the retroactive application of Supreme
Court rules. Surely the district court does not have authority to effectively disregard or supplant
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rules established by the higher authority of the Supreme Court. That is an improper use of the
district court's power and jurisdiction.
Finally, the district court's errant reliance on the "retroactivity" principle is plainly
manifest in the resulting inconsistencies. The district court prevented the plaintiffs/appellants
from relying upon findings or rulings in the Building Contractors Case which support their
claims, while at the same time relying upon such rulings and findings which support defendant's

claims. For instance, the district court decided to "retroactively" apply the Building Contractors
Decision with regard to whether there was impermissible use and calculation of the
Connection/Capacity Fees, but did not apply its decision retroactively with regard to the City's

liability on its impermissible PILOT program. (See Section V Infra.) In other words, the district
court relied heavily upon the Building Contractors Case in granting summary judgment to the
City on issues decided in the case, effectively making such decisions "retroactive," but not doing
the same for the plaintiffs. This in itself demonstrates the misguided approach taken by the
district court.

In short, the district court's Memorandum Decision in the Building Contractors Case was
not an "overruling" decision of a "prevailing rule," but rather an affirmation of existing rules

adopted by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the district court neither had the basis nor the
authority to only "prospectively" apply these rules, and doing so was an error.

V.

The District Disregarded the Harsh and Unjust Ramifications of its Decision
to Deny Plaintiffs' Relief.

Even if the district had authority to conduct an analysis of whether it should
"retroactively" apply the Building Contractors Case (i.e. via the three factors outlined in BHA

Investments), its decision does not address whatsoever the manifest injustice and damages that
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plaintiffs, including in particular Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park (Hill-Vu), suffered as a result of the
City's illegal PILOT program.
The Memorandum Decision noted the potential "adverse effects" of having to repay the
fees improperly collected in the PILOT program. 66 However, it disregards the serious harms that
it caused Hill-Vu and other rate payers. Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson-who is not a resident
of the City of Pocatello - testified that the City had collected $840,000 from him in user fees
since the implementation of the PILOT program. 67 Conservatively, assuming that 10% of those
fees consisted of the PILOT component, no less than $84,000 was improperly taken by the City.
That is serious and substantial harm to which the district court paid no heed. The district court's
analysis should not have been one sided. It should not have simply automatically disregarded the
harms to other rate payers.
Again, there is no authority or justification for the Court to decide not to retroactively
apply the Building Contractors Case (including the Idaho Supreme Court authority cited in the
case). Regardless, the Court must consider the injustice or harms that the City's improper
conduct caused, and yet adds another reason for this Court to reverse the district court.
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V.

The District Court Disregarded the Facts and Law that Supported the
Claims as it Pertained to Connection/Capacity Fee Payers.

In its Memorandum Decision, the district court also denied relief to Connection/Capacity
Fee payers - ironically- relying upon or "retroactively applying" its decision in the Building
Contractors Case that there was "no evidence that the Connection/Capacity Fees contained
PILOT component" and therefore no basis for relief. 68 In so doing, the district court errantly
disregarded both the facts - including in particular the facts that developed after the case, as well
as well established law that clearly establishes a basis of relief for Connection/Capacity Fee
payers.
A.

Connection/Capacity Fees that are not used for their intended and authorized
purposes are disguised taxes regardless of how they were calculated.

In considering whether the Connection/Capacity Fees were "disguised taxes" that entitled

the plaintiffs/appellants to relief, the district court relied upon its "Show Cause Decision" in the
Building Contractors Case wherein it found that there was no PILOT Component in the
"calculation" of the Connection/Capacity Fees. 69 However, here the district court erred in that it
failed to consider how the fees were used.
In a leading Idaho case Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 1272 (1991 ),
the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a connection fee being collected by the City of
Hailey under the so called "equity buy-in" formula developed by the City. In so doing, however,
the Court established a distinct and fimdamental test that must be determined before any analysis
of the calculation or assessment of a connection fee:
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First, we must determine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible tax.
Secondly, we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and reasonably
assessed.

Id. 119 Idaho at 438, 807 P.2d at 1277. (emphasis added)
The Court then provides the analysis for what constitutes "an impermissible tax:"
The Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the collection of sewer connection fees, Schmidt
v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953), and it is clear that so long as
the fees collected pursuant to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act are allocated and budgeted in
conformity with that Act they will not be construed as taxes. However, if fees are
collected under the disguise of the Act and allocated and spent otherwise, then the fees
are primarily revenue raising and will be construed as taxes. Brewster v. City of
Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1989). Thus, to determine whether the sewer
connection fees are in reality taxes in disguise we must determine whether the monies
collected from those funds are dispersed in accordance with that Act.

Id.
In applying the analysis to the facts in Loomis, the Court held that:
It is undisputed that the City of Hailey places the connection fees into a separate fund to
be used for replacement of sewer and water system components, however, no monies
from this fund are transferred to the city's general fund, and none are used to retire the
bond indebtedness. 70 The monthly service charges are used to pay for the bond
indebtedness and general operating costs of the systems.

Id. (emphasis added)
If further held that:

In the present case, the fact that connection fees are specifically expended on replacement
of system components is entirely within the discretion of the city government as long as
other revenues allowed by LC. § 50-1033 from the system are appropriately used to pay
for the other necessary pm:poses including retirement of bond indebtedness.

Id. 119 Idaho at 440, 807 P.2d at 1278. (emphasis added).

70

As will be discussed and applied infra, the Loomis Court acknowledged that
connection fees cannot be used for "general fund" purposes or to "retire bond indebtedness."
That is because according to the statute bond payments are to be derived solely from the monthly
charges for services (i.e. the user fee.) Id. IC§ 50-1033.
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In essence, this Court made it abundantly clear in Loomis that regardless of how the
municipality assesses or calculates fees, it cannot improperly use the funds. This approach
simply makes sense, in that it prevents mischief or the "facade" of a particular fee calculation
which has the appearance of propriety but which in fact hides the improper use of the fees. Thus,
the real question for determining whether a "fee" is in fact a "disguised tax" is not how it is
calculated, but rather how it is used. In other words, the finder of fact should simply follow the
money to determine whether there is a disguised tax.

In this case, there is no dispute that

connection fees have been improperly used in the past and since the decision in the Building
Contractors Case.
B.

As reflected in the Building Contractors Case connection fees were historically
co-mingled and transferred to the general fund for the PILOT.

In "following the money" there is no question that historically the Connection/Capacity
Fees were co-mingled with the user fee funds that were improperly transferred and used in the
general fund as part of the PILOT (prior to March of2013.) This was documented beginning
with page 7 and throughout the Memorandum Decision in the Building Contractors Case,
wherein the district court affirmed that: ( 1) that there was never "any evidence as to how the
connection fees and user fees could have been over separately accounted for prior to March
2013" and (2) "[a]fter the connection and user fees were co-mingled into the water and sewer
funds, the evidence supports, and the city concedes, that the city then transferred money from the
water and sewer funds into the general fund under transfers at a been called by various names. "71
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C.

Evidence obtained after the Building Contractors Case shows that
Connection/Capacity Fees were improperly used to re-pay bond indebtedness.

In its Memorandum Decision, the district court virtually ignored new evidence with
regard to how the Connection/Capacity Fees were utilized after the Building Contractors Case.
This was an error by the court, because had it considered this new evidence, it would have found
its previous decision in the "Show Cause Decision" (upholding the calculation of the
Connection/Capacity Fees) largely moot or inapplicable.
Again, after the Building Contractors Case, the City reallocated the equivalent of the
entire amount of Connection/Capacity Fees collected from 2007-2015 to "debt retirement,"

rather than its intended uses. 72 In other words, in conduct occurring after the filing of this case,
after the City transferred the equivalent of what it had collected and spent in
Connection/Capacity Fees into Funds 37/38, rather than spend those funds on the "replacement,
maintenance or repair" of the existing system as required by statute and which it has long
indicated to the public were the intended use of these funds, it instead has spent or budgeted all
those fees and the fees collected thereafter on repayment of bonds which is not authorized by
law. As emphasized in the Loomis decision, connection fees are not to be used for bond

retirement, but rather the debt obligations should come from the monthly user fees. Loomis at
119 Idaho at 440, 807 P.2d at 1278, IC§ 50-1033.
Simply put, in "following the money," there is at the very least a factual dispute over
whether not one single Connection/Capacity Fee dollar since 2007 has been spent for authorized
uses under law. Again, the evidence suggests that from 2007 through March of 2013, no

72

See again the Statement of Facts infra.
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Connection/Capacity Fees were spent on replacement, maintenance or repairs of the system, but
rather were transferred to the general fund where they were improperly expended for the general
purposes of the City. Then, in March of 2013, in a blatant attempt to "cover its tracks," the City
transferred the equivalent of what it had collected in connection fees into the newly created
Funds 37/38. However, those funds, and the connection fees collected thereafter, were then
improperly spent and allocated for debt retirement, effectively removing that statutory obligation
from the monthly user fees contrary to IC§ 50-1033.
D.

The improper allocation of 100% of the Connection/Capacity Fees toward debt
retirement also brings into question whether the fees were properly calculated and
assessed, potentially entitling appellants/plaintiffs to equitable relief.

In their initial complaint, along with monetary damages, plaintiffs/appellants sought "any

other legal or equitable relieve deemed justified by the Court.'m They identified such equitable
remedies in the form of injunctive and declaratory relief pertaining to the newly found evidence
of the misuse of the Connection/Capacity Fees in their response to City's Motion for Summary
Judgment. 74 In addition, plaintiffs/appellants attempted to amend their complaint to reflect such
relief, and were denied - again largely because the district court found that the new claims were
"invalid" because it had already decided in the Building Contractors Case that the "collection of
the Connection/Capacity Fees were consistent with Idaho law."75 76
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R. Vol. I, p. 12.
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R. Vol I, pp. 561-64.

75

R. Vol. I, pp. 602-612.
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R. Vol. I, p. 729. The district court also denied plaintiffs/appellants motion to amend
on the basis of timeliness and delays, which would obviously be rendered moot in the event that
the appeal is granted and a new trial date is set.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 34

Again, it was an error for the district court to not consider plaintiffs/appellants' claims as
it pertains to equitable relief. Throughout the Building Contractors Case and this case, the City
has heavily promoted the "Red Oak" studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as the supporting basis
for the assessment of User Fees and Connection/Capacity Fees in the City of Pocatello. The
district court had relied upon the Red Oak studies in determining that the City's assessment of
the Connection/Capacity Fees, including the steep increases, were appropriate. However the
additional evidence in this case raises questions as to whether the City did not implement a
Connection/Capacity Fee based on what was publicized by the Red Oak studies, suggesting that
the studies were prepared and presented by the City in bad faith as well as bringing into serious
question the methodology that was allegedly used in the studies to calculate the fees. 77
In essence, there is at least a factual question as to whether the Red Oak studies falsely
represented a baseline and calculation for the Connection/Capacity Fees. Such fees were never
used for "replacement" of the existing system as advertised in the studies. They were also
misrepresented to be calculated after "deducting outstanding debt from system value" because
such "charges" belong to the "existing customers" not the new connectors. 78
The Red Oak studies arguably were nothing more than a false premise to justify the
increases in the fees, which in the end were improperly used for the general purposes of the City
and/or for the debt obligations which by statute are the obligation the user fees. This kind of bad
faith or arbitrary and capricious conduct should have been subject to equitable treatment by the
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See again the intended purposes of the fees and the basis of the fee calculations in R.
Vol. I, pp. 541-53, and the Statement of Facts infra.
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Id.
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Court - either under the original complaint or the amended complaint - and it was an error for
the court not to consider such relief.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's decision dismissing the
plaintiffs/appellants' claims on summary judgment. It should find that improperly assessed or
spent Connection/Capacity Fees and User Fees (respectively) may legally be considered "fees
disguised as taxes" subject to a takings claim. It should alternatively or additionally find that
there are disputed facts as to whether the impermissible fees were implemented with malice and
reckless disregard to the fee payers, making the fees subject to an unjust enrichment claim. It
should also reverse the district court's misapplication ofretroactivity principles. Finally, it
should allow appellants/plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief with regard to the calculation of
Connection/Capacity Fees to proceed as well.

DATED

this

3rd

day of October, 2016.

PA
Attorneys for the Appellants
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